Fred Fleitz (left) and Adam Savit (right).

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(Interviewer: Satoshi Nishihata)

 

Biden Administration Copies Trump Policies Against China

Q: What are the main differences in the China policy between the Biden-Harris and the Trump administration? Some people argue that the Biden-Harris administration may not be much different from Trump’s.

Fleitz: I’d like to first start by thanking you for this opportunity to speak with you and to express our analysis. However, I have to stipulate—we are not part of the Trump campaign. We do not speak for President Trump. It would be inappropriate to say that we are telling you what he is going to do. These are our opinions, not his policies. They are not policy positions of the Trump campaign; we work for a non-profit think tank.

Regarding this question, we have seen a general national security policy by the Biden-Harris administration that has been extremely naive that has allowed the threat from China to surge since 2021. I don’t think any of us would challenge the fact that the world is much more dangerous today and the China threat is much greater today than it was when Trump left office.

I think Biden has been a much weaker president. American deterrence worldwide has deteriorated, starting with the reckless withdrawal from Afghanistan, and we’ve seen a foreign policy that has frankly been frivolous. I say that because the Biden-Harris administration has said that the top national security issue for the United States is climate change—not China, not nuclear proliferation, not terrorism. We just think this is foolish. That’s why the world is so dangerous right now.

From what we can tell, Kamala Harris will be worse. Trump will have a strong policy against China. He’s going to hold China accountable. I think he’ll be tough, but also be interested in dialogue to lower tensions.

We believe in peace through strength. I think President Trump believes in that too. He will promote stability, and, hopefully, significantly lower tensions in the Asia-Pacific.

Savit: I would second everything that Fred said.

In addition, I would like to refer to your point that some people think Trump and Biden-Harris policies are not much different. That’s an affirmation of the Trump administration policies, which at the time were revolutionary. From the decoupling to the tariffing, which everyone said would be an economic catastrophe, brought leverage against the Chinese government and brought them to the table for the Phase One trade deal for the first time. This ability to bring them to the table at all was unprecedented.

The success or the usefulness of the Trump trade policies is borne out by the fact that indeed, the Biden administration did not go back on any of those policies. In fact, he followed some of them to their logical conclusion. This includes controls on technology exports, which is related to decoupling.

In the sense that Trump was a pioneer and that Trump’s policy was successful, the Biden administration could not help but follow it on the economic end.

I would echo Fred’s statement that the key, though, is that no matter what the policies are on paper, what we’re lacking now is leadership and deterrence. So, it almost does not matter—you cannot have a successful policy unless you have a credible, strong president behind it. That’s the key.

 

Q: How do you think the second Trump administration will implement the strategic decoupling with China?

Savit: The first Trump administration put us on the road to that success. It set the initial parameters, but there’s still a dire need to drill down on the most critical sectors which we are still vulnerable on.

One big example would be the supply chains of rare earth elements. There are different estimates, but probably about 65% of mining and 80% of refining of these elements are controlled by China. These elements go into important economic sectors such as semiconductors, but they also go into direct defense applications, such as magnets and batteries which are crucial for systems such as our F-35 stealth fighter and nuclear submarines. These are small but critical pieces which are still completely beholden to Chinese supply chains.

There’s been efforts with the CHIPS Act to increase onshore semiconductor production, but it involves an entire constellation of allies and friends and our own domestic capacity. Japan is one country which is important to that supply chain. We need to leverage the fact that we have allies with strong economies—allies that we can trust with these supply chains—as opposed to China who really has no allies because they’ve burned a lot of bridges. If we can starve them of that semiconductor technology and keep them off those supply chains, that will be crucial.

 

Q: Trump has pledged to impose 60% to 100% tariffs on Chinese goods to increase U.S. jobs. How successful do you think were the tariffs on Chinese goods during the previous Trump administration?

Fleitz: The tariffs are going to be part of the Trump strategy at decoupling. It not only increases U.S. jobs but also counters rogue behavior by China, such as the export of fentanyl and the provocations against Taiwan.

I think there will be very decisive action by a second Trump administration to enforce oil sanctions against Iran, which this administration is not enforcing. They were enforced under the Trump administration against China, with Trump making clear that there would be consequences if they were violated.

Iran is getting close to a nuclear weapon. They are sponsoring terrorism throughout the Middle East, and China’s oil purchases from Iran are helping finance this. That’s going to stop, in my opinion, in a second Trump administration.

 

Stronger Russia-China Relationship Is Detrimental to the World

Q: Russia, China, North Korea and Iran have become increasingly aligned partially as a result of the Ukraine war under the current administration. If the four countries work together, it is militarily and geopolitically very difficult to push China into a corner.

Fleitz: Trump is going to treat China as the major threat to American and global security. I think there’s going to be tough tariffs. There’s going to be tough policies to hold China accountable.

It’s going to focus on a whole range of threats, including this so-called axis that’s developed between Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. Now, this axis may be partially countered by ending the war in Ukraine, which will make it hopefully hard for North Korea to continue selling weapons to Russia. If the war in Ukraine ends, I’m hoping this relationship between Russia and China will be weakened.

Long-term, I think Russia should be incorporated into Europe as a European power. It’s historically been a European power, not an Asian power.

This growing relationship between Russia and China is very bad for global security. We need to have a long-term strategy to break this growing relationship between Russia and China and someday, probably after Putin, to incorporate Russia as a full-fledged member of the European nations.

 

Q: How can Japan and the U.S. avoid the China-Russia-North Korea ties to focus on deterring China? Japan has been following the Biden administration. Therefore, it has been forced into a three-front strategy of confronting the three nuclear powers of Russia, China and North Korea. Japan seems unable to adequately deal with the Taiwan contingency, and it seems that the U.S. and Japanese strategies towards China and simulations of the Taiwan contingency may have been designed to fight China alone without a possibility of the three countries’ alliance. For Japan to focus on deterring China, it will be necessary to prevent at least North Korea and Russia from intervening. What are your thoughts on this?

Fleitz: It’s interesting that in my recent travels in Japan, I heard some Japanese officials saying: “The relations between the U.S. and Japan have never been better.” I said, “Sure they were, during the Abe administration.” Trump and Abe could not have been closer friends.

I give the Biden administration credit for this trilateral arrangement at the Camp David meeting from last year. But frankly, this was reactive because the Biden administration was extremely alarmed that the South Korean government was going to bring nuclear weapons back to South Korea. This got President Yoon a state visit, and the end result was fairly positive.

The issues you are raising can be addressed in a number of ways. I think the best way to deal with the possibility of a war with China is to lower tensions through diplomacy.

A few months before he died, Henry Kissinger said that one of the major flaws of this administration’s foreign policy is that there’s been very little diplomacy between the U.S. and China, U.S. and Russia. Biden hasn’t spoken to Putin since February 2022. He’s had some meetings and discussions with Xi, but frankly, they were not serious. There should be some type of working-level meeting between U.S. and Chinese officials to try to keep tensions from spinning out of control, but there has to be much better engagement at a higher level to lower tensions.

If the Ukraine war ends, and Trump begins diplomacy with Kim Jong Un and tensions between the U.S. and China are lowered, a lot of the issues you mentioned will disappear.

Global security has become much worse since Biden came to office. This can be countered by a president with a global strategy. They are all interlinked, from Ukraine to Russia to North Korea to China to South Korea to Japan.

There are a lot of ways to deal with a contingency of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. One method is to lower tensions with China, which this administration seems to have no idea how to do. I think Trump can do it.

 

Japan Is Crucial in Any Taiwan Emergency

Q: In your book, you state, “Japan would be our most important partner in a Taiwan contingency, outside of Taiwan itself.” Why is the U.S.-Japan alliance crucial to counter China?

Savit: If, God forbid, there was a hot war between the U.S. and China over Taiwan, Japan would unfortunately be drawn right in. That’s because the Ryukyu islands end just 90 miles off of Taiwan.

For China to invade or enforce a blockade, they will need to go around the east side of Taiwan. They would need to neutralize those islands, which would bring Japan right in. The U.S. bases in Okinawa and the mainland as well as the U.S. Navy stationed in these regions will likely come under missile attack. Japanese territory will probably be attacked.

With its third-largest economy, Japan is the only regional power with the capability to build up its military. They made a promise to put more spending into the military, specifically into the systems that can help Taiwan in a contingency. They are building aircraft carriers or de facto aircraft carriers and hundreds of missiles with the standoff capabilities to hit mainland China. Japan is crucial to any deterrence in the region.

 

Q: Do you think Trump will take a hardline policy, such as overthrowing the CCP?

Fleitz: President Trump has raised his close relationship with President Xi. I think there will be tough policies, but there’s also going to be dialogue for cooperation with Beijing.

Savit: I would say there is no interest. In the chapter, what we say is we want to make CCP policies as irrelevant to American life as possible. We are not interested in overthrowing the regime. We are not interested in controlling how one-plus billion people live. We just want to make sure the American people are secure and safe and that our allies are secure and safe. The Chinese people will have to deal with the regime.

 

Nuclear Diplomacy With Kim Jong Un Will Be A Major Accomplishment

Q: What steps do you think Trump will take to address the North Korean nuclear issues when the new Trump administration takes office?

Fleitz: Again, I’m speaking for myself. I don’t know what Trump will do.

I do know that President Trump is quite proud of his bilateral personal relationship with Kim Jong Un. I expect he will attempt to resume that if he’s reelected. The North Korean government has said that Kim is not interested, but I don’t believe that.

There’s been some very troubling developments since 2021 and 2022. North Korea test-fired a record number of missiles, including at least two missiles fired over Japan, which is a great concern. We know North Korea is testing ICBMs with the capability of hitting the east coast of the United States, and these missiles are being designed to carry nuclear warheads. There are hypersonic missiles. There’s a so-called submarine. I’m not sure if the submarine is real, and I wonder, if it went underwater, that it never comes back up. These are very troubling developments in North Korea’s arsenal that require aggressive strategies.

There has been a part-time special envoy for North Korea who was also an ambassador to Indonesia. He resigned late last year, and the current administration still hasn’t replaced him. I think this indicated to Kim that the Biden administration thought North Korea didn’t matter.

There has been a serious policy of neglect by the Biden administration. Maybe this has been a return to Obama’s strategic patience policy towards North Korea. It has improved ever since President Yoon said he will try to bring nuclear weapons back to South Korea, but I think Trump will have a serious strategy of engagement with North Korea.

I would guess that there might be some strings attached to a Kim meeting. I would encourage Trump to say to Kim, “I’m not going to meet with you if you keep selling weapons to Russia for use in Ukraine.”

Trump is an excellent dealmaker. I think he’ll strike a really good deal and lower tensions. I don’t know whether we can convince North Korea to get rid of its nuclear weapons in the near future, but Kim agreed at the Singapore Summit to denuclearize. North Korea had never agreed to do that before.

I think there would have been major accomplishments if it weren’t for the pandemic and Trump not being reelected.

It didn’t achieve everything we wanted, but the missile tests stopped. There has not been a nuclear test since September of 2017. That nuclear test was extremely frightening. It may have had a yield of 250 kilotons. It may have been a type of mixed fusion nuclear device. Even China was upset at that because they don’t want nuclear weapons being tested on their doorstep.

Trump’s tough policies and his interest in personal engagement significantly promoted security in the region by lowering tensions with North Korea. I think he can do that again.

 

Q: Do you have any thoughts on the relationship between China and North Korea?

Fleitz: I am very concerned at the increased collaboration between Russia and China with North Korea. There was a military parade last year. For the first time, senior Chinese and Russian officials both appeared simultaneously with Kim. This is significant because the North Koreans have played each nation off the other in the past, and both nations had also discouraged Kim from pursuing long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. However, here we had, both Chinese and Russian officials present at a large military parade. It was extraordinary to see these leaders there.

I think that with a strong and decisive president willing to engage with North Korea, maybe we can break that relationship.

 

Q: Do you think the Trump administration may allow Japan to possess nuclear arms?

Fleitz: I believe that President Trump will be an absolute strong defender of the nuclear umbrella for our friends in the Asia-Pacific. There will be no question about that. If South Korea and Japan are looking at other avenues to discuss the possibility of a nuclear weapon, it’s a far-leaping guess, but I think Trump would be willing to listen. That’s as much as I can infer.

 

Unorthodox Diplomacy Brings Peace

Q: Some people, including Japanese leaders, think that Trump is a businessman, so depending on the deal, he may compromise with China or North Korea.

Fleitz: Let’s talk about the Singapore Summit and how we got up to that summit. This was unorthodox diplomacy: the president of the United States, willing to meet with Kim Jong Un, a ruthless dictator with a horrible human rights record, with a nuclear arsenal and missiles.

However, before he did, he consulted extensively with South Korea and Japan. Prime Minister Abe met with him and spent hours and hours on the phone with President Trump to prepare for the Singapore Summit.

Trump didn’t agree to anything at the Singapore or the Vietnam Summits that our allies would have objected to. In fact, the Vietnam Summit broke down because Trump would not make compromises that Kim thought Trump was going to make. Trump stood his ground.

Trump knew how North Korea was going to negotiate: they love to get concessions either in exchange for agreeing to nothing or to agreeing to things that they are not going to fulfill. There were certain conditions for denuclearization that were brought up at the Singapore Summit and at the Vietnam Summit. The North wasn’t prepared to meet these conditions in Vietnam. They agreed to close one nuclear site, but there were other nuclear sites that the U.S. thought should be closed. The North Korean government wasn’t prepared to do that. I’m not sure they knew we knew about those facilities.

I hear your concern. But Trump is not just a businessman or transactional, he’s unconventional. I believe this unconventional approach to diplomacy has been a plus and in the interest of people in the region.

What is the traditional approach to negotiations with North Korea? Six-party talks where China and Russia are present. What did they accomplish? Nothing. Keeping China out of negotiations with North Korea was a brilliant stroke because China has no interest in an agreement that does not advance China. They are only interested in the advancement of their own interests.

Savit: I’ve heard from several Japanese sources that Trump, being a businessman, may make some sort of grand deal with China where Japan and other regional players are left out.

I’m not speaking on Trump’s behalf, but my best analysis is that there is no way he would do anything like that. Take the Phase One deal. Not only were there features that required them to buy our exports, but there were also features to stop intellectual property theft, currency manipulation and other malicious actions by China. There’s a big difference between China and our allies or even neutral powers. I believe that he understands the strategic threat—the fact that the Chinese Communist Party will never really be an honest interlocutor.

Fleitz: America Alone is not isolationism. We make that clear in our book. Despite Trump’s aggressive foreign policy, including his dealing with Kim Jong Un, the Abraham Accords and engaging in Russia and China, his adversaries still claim that he’s an isolationist. It’s absurd. It was not true.